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In order to ensure condentiality, integrity and availability (so
called CIA triad) of data within network infrastructure, it is neces-
sary to be able to detect and handle cyber security incidents. For
this purpose, it is vital for Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRT) to have enough data on relevant security events and
threats. That is why CSIRTs share security alerts and incidents data
using various sharing platforms. Even though they do so primarily
to protect data and privacy of users, their use also lead to additional
processing of personal data, which may cause new privacy risks.
European data protection law, especially with the adoption of the
new General data protection regulation, sets out very strict rules
on processing of personal data which on one hand leads to greater
protection of individual’s rights, but on the other creates great ob-
stacles for those who need to share any personal data. This paper
analyses the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), relevant
case-law and analyses by the Article 29 Working Party to propose
optimal methods and level of personal data processing necessary
for eective use of security alert sharing platforms, which would
be legally compliant and lead to appropriate balance between risks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Frequency and magnitude of cyber security incidents is constantly
increasing. Due to the borderless nature of these incidents, it is ab-
solutely necessary for Computer Security Incident Response Teams
(CSIRT) to coordinate their eorts, ensure rapid response and share
data regardless of what kind of organisation they aim to protect.
For this purpose they use wide spectrum of technical tools from
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which are some of the most eective alert sharing platforms. They
allow for eective sharing of information about cyber security inci-
dents and threats and their comprehensive analysis. Use of these
platforms not only protects peers of the platform, but also helps to
increase security of the whole cyberspace.
Some of the data shared and analysed using these platforms
however contain information about users or other persons. This
personal data is in most modern countries protected by data protec-
tion laws, because in some cases can its use and processing threaten
privacy of data subjects. European union is at the forefront of le-
gal protection of privacy, since it strictly regulates processing of
personal data. The current EU 1998 Data Protection Directive will
be replaced in May of 2018 by General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) which imposes even more strict rules to handling personal
data. In order to ensure legality of alert sharing platforms, it is
necessary to make them compliant with the GDPR. In this paper,
we address the issue of compliance. The research question is:
How the data protection limit the operation of se-
curity alert sharing platforms and how to ensure its
compliance?
This paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 surveys re-
lated work. Section 3 provides technical background on security
alert sharing platforms, while legal background is provided in Sec-
tion 4. Proposed measures on how to make security alert sharing
platforms compliant with GDPR are presented in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
The related work consists of two parts, technical background and
legal aspects.
2.1 Technical background
The alert sharing platforms emerged from two theoretical con-
cepts, alert correlation and collaborative intrusion detection. The
approaches to alert correlation were proposed by Valeur et al. [19].
In this work, alert life-cycle and common tasks of alert correlation
are proposed. Collaborative security and collaborative intrusion
detection were surveyed recently by Meng et al. [15] and Vasilo-
manolakis et al. [21]. Formats and protocols for exchanging security
events were briey surveyed by Steinberger et al. [18].
As the research continues, the CSIRT community makes eorts
to implement collaborative security and information sharing in
practice. These eorts were surveyed in reports by ENISA [9]. Un-
fortunately, many competing standards, tools, and platforms exist
and it is hard to select the outstanding ones. One of the most well-
known information sharing platforms is MISP [22], that focuses on
exchange of indicators of compromise (IoC) obtained from malware.
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An example of centralized alert sharing platform is CIF (Collec-
tive Intelligence Framework). Lately, TAXII (Trusted Automated
eXchange of Indicator Information) gain a lot of attention. The
comprehensive list of platforms is also provided by ENISA [10].
The data exchange formats and serialization are also worth men-
tioning as their many examples get a good insight into what is a
security alert. IDMEF [7] is one of the most well-known security
alert exchange formats that is used among the research community.
Practitioners prefer IODEF [6], which is compatible with IDMEF.
Lately, STIX gained attention in the cyber security community.
There are a lot of examples of security alerts in these formats, as
well as their comparison, in the related literature [10, 18].
2.2 Legal aspects
Legal aspects of alert sharing platforms belong to broader discussion
about cyber security, privacy and law. Some of the basic concepts of
this discussion can be found in the paper of Sokol et al. [17] In this
paper there can be also found argumentation about IP addresses
which authors regard as a personal data even in the meaning of the
current Data Protection Directive.
Serrano et al. [16] focus on the legal aspects of the cyber secu-
rity data sharing between organisations subject to dierent legal
frameworks. They also propose a solution in form of Information
Exchange Policy which is set up by the organisations themselves.
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
published study which deals with legal and regulatory factors and
perform an assessment of what eects these factors have on cross-
border data sharing between CERTs [8]. One these factors which
the study focuses on is the European legal framework governing
data protection and privacy. The study provides an example of legal
checklist for privacy and data protection.
3 HOW THE SHARING PLATFORMWORKS
This section presents a background on security information sharing
and alert sharing platforms. First, the purpose of sharing is stated,
followed by the description of actual content, e. g., the shared data.
Then, the life-cycle of data is described and the section closes with
the benets of shared data to their recipients.
3.1 What is the purpose of sharing
The motivation behind sharing the security alerts is an increased
security among the peers. However, there are other purposes of
sharing the data, e. g., building global cyber security situational
awareness and cyber threat intelligence.
Isolated intrusion detection systems have only a limited scope
of observation, e. g., on the network. They also cannot detect un-
known attacks and they depend on updates from their vendors. Ex-
change of knowledge and information allows the peers to achieve
higher accuracy in intrusion detection by correlating the results
with others, receiving additional information and knowledge, and
even preventing attacks that could otherwise remain unnoticed.
Thus, collaboration increases the detection capabilities of individual
peers [12].
The other use cases of sharing the cyber security data is build-
ing of global situational awareness and cyber threat intelligence.
Keeping records on cyber events from a single observation point
may be biased towards the systems and setup of a corresponding
network. On the other hand, correlation of observations from multi-
ple heterogeneous observation points allows better understanding
of current trends in malicious network activities. Understanding
which security events are of local signicance and which are global
allows us to distinguish targeted attacks.
3.2 What is being shared
Basically, every piece of data can be shared. However, the ve most
common types of shared data are reports of security incidents or
alerts, indicators of compromise (IoC), raw data, and tools. Raw data
are typically exchanged between collaborative intrusion detection
systems [12]. "Incident" data usually contain all the information
related to a security incident, including sensitive information, which
cannot be shared easily. Security "events" contain non-sensitive
metadata related to an incident [9]. Indicators of compromise are
artifacts found in a system or in the network trac that indicate an
intrusion. The IoCs and security events are often interchangeable.
Finally, the tools may also be a subject of sharing, but these typically
do not contain any information apart from source codes or binaries.
The content of the shared data may vary depending on type
of sharing and willingness of sharing peers to provide complete
information. Raw data and incident data may contain basically ev-
erything, from malicious network trac captures in a PCAP le
to malware binaries and snapshots of infected systems. However,
due to technical diculties of sharing large volumes of data, only
network trac records, e. g., NetFlow [14], or system logs are being
used. On the other hand, security events and IoC typically contain
a small piece of information, typically IP addresses, email addresses,
malware signatures, domain names, URLs, etc. The dierence be-
tween security event and IoC contents are rather semantic, even if
they are of the same type, e. g., IP address. Security events contain
identiers of active participants of an event, e. g., an attacker and
a target. IoCs, on the other hand, contain information such as IP
address of a botnet C&C center that is not yet necessarily involved
in any activity.
3.3 Life-cycle of the data
There are many approaches to sharing the data. Thus, it is dicult
to present a denite life-cycle of the data. For the purposes of this
paper, we took the alert sharing platform SABU1 as an example on
which we show the alert life-cycle. Our alert sharing platform is
centralized and distinguishes senders and receivers of the alerts.
The data processing is performed at the central hub for all the alerts.
First, the data are collected. The alerts are generated by various
intrusion and anomaly detection systems. Alternatively, the alerts
can be inserted manually by users and obtained from another alert
sharing platform.
Second, the data are distributed. In case of a centralized sharing
platform, all the alerts are sent to a central repository. The central
point then can process the data before their actual utilization. Al-
ternatively, the data can be exchanged directly among peers, which
is common in collaborative intrusion detection networks [12].
Third, the data are correlated. Alert correlation consists of many
procedures that help in analyzing the data, but they also serve
1https://sabu.cesnet.cz/en/start
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as means of data quality assurance. The common tasks of alert
correlation, as described by Valeur et al. [19], are normalization,
pre-processing, alert fusion, alert verication, thread reconstruc-
tion, focus recognition, impact analysis, and prioritization. The data
are at rst converted to a unied format, their syntax is validated,
and the duplicated alerts are fused. Then, the alerts are mutually
checked to conrm their sanity and to reveal false positives. Fur-
ther, attack sequences are matched against historical records, and
the anticipated target and impact are projected and the alerts are
prioritized accordingly. In this phase of an alert life-cycle, the novel
pieces of information are distilled from the alerts, often with a
certain degree of uncertainty.
Fourth, the data are re-distributed and utilized by the receiving
peers. In this phase, all the peers can access the data and utilize
them, unless any restriction and specic distribution rules are used.
Often the recipients use lters to receive only the alert of a cer-
tain type to avoid processing the large volumes of data. Once a
recipients receive the data, they can be applied in protecting the
network. Typically, the identiers from the received alerts, e. g., IP
addresses, are put on blacklists. Firewall rules and other network
trac ltering mechanisms may be applied to drop the incoming
trac from subjects enlisted in the alerts or the prevent local users
from accessing them. In this phase, the data from the alerts are
actively used to inuence the outer world.
If a central repository is used, the data are kept there. It is vital
to keep the data for longer time for the purposes of advanced alert
analyses and threat intelligence. Permanent data storage can be
used, but it is actually not common due to large volumes of the data
(security alerts can be considered as big data) and short life-time of
the individual alerts. Thus, the alerts are typically dismissed after
several days or weeks. On the other hand, the derived and statistical
information, e. g., counts and shares of alert types, are typically
stored for a longer time.
3.4 How does the sharing benet the data
subject
Information sharing benets the recipients of the data in multiple
ways. The shared data may be used as a blacklist, early warning,
and to improve accuracy and precision of intrusion detection.
The blacklists are reactive. They contain identiers, e. g., IP ad-
dresses and URLs, of malicious entities that can be used for imme-
diate incident response, e. g., network trac ltering and access
restrictions. This data should be highly trustful as they are used to
protect the network of a recipient.
Early warning data are preventive and consist of events that
are likely to happen or identiers of subjects that are likely to be
involved in future security events. For example, worm propagation
was detection in one network and it is known from historical records
that other networks are going to be infected soon, thus, the other
networks are informed.
Finally, the shared data can be used by intrusion detection sys-
tems to increase capabilities and precision of intrusion detection.
Shared IoCs and other identiers and signatures allows for the
detection of events that would otherwise remain unnoticed due to
insucient IDS capabilities.
4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
4.1 Evolution of data protection in the EU
"Data protection" law refers to the legal scheme governing the
collection, storage, processing, disclosure, and transfer of individ-
ual’s personal data. Data protection is dynamic and increasingly
important topic that is related to many core political and legal
concerns, including the freedom of expression, security, and inter-
national business. Graham stated in one of his recent studies that
"data privacy laws are spreading globally, and their number and
geographical diversity accelerating since 2000." [13]
In Europe, which is recognized as a global leader in data protec-
tion, implemented legal tools focus on protection of individual’s
fundamental right to privacy in general, and more specically on
protection of right to information self-determination. These rights
are in the EU guaranteed in two supranational conventions - the
European Convention for Human Rights and the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. In compliance with these conventions, individual’s
rights are enforced on three levels - by individual European states,
by the Council of Europe and by the European Union. Anyone who
seeks to collect, analyze or otherwise process the personal data of
natural persons in Europe is required to take time to understand
relevant European data protection rules.
Existing 1998 Data protection directive (no. 95/46/EC) sets out
rules that are mandatory for EU member states to implement. This
legal tool however seems to be rather obsolete for two main rea-
sons. First, when the directive was drafted in 1995 legislators did not
anticipate such a rapid development of information technologies.
Second, it is implemented and interpreted in dierent EU states
dierently, which weakens legal certainty of data subjects and con-
stitutes obstacles to the exercise of their rights. Until now, these
shortcomings have been remedied by the case law, which has ex-
panded the understanding of EU jurisdiction (e. g., in cases Google
Spain C-131/12 and Weltimmo C-230/14) and the range of data that
is considered personal (e. g., case Breyer C-582/14).
However, this was not enough, which is why the EU was from
2013 drafting a new data protection regulation that seeks to in-
crease the level of data protection across the Union’s twenty-seven
member states and beyond. This regulation comes into force on
25 May 2018 as Regulation no. 2016/679. Another relevant piece of
legislation is so called e-Privacy directive (no. 2002/58/EC) which
focuses on the protection of privacy in the sector of electronic com-
munications. This directive is a lex specialis to the Data protection
directive (and to the GDPR), which deals specically with privacy
issues related to electronic communications, such as data retention,
condentiality of communications, etc. This directive will how-
ever also be subject to replacement by new regulation, proposal for
which was introduced by European Commission in January 2017.
4.2 The GDPR
The GDPR replaces the current Data Protection Directive from
1998. The main intent of the GDPR is to give individuals more
control over their personal data, impose stricter rules to companies
handling it and make sure companies embrace new technology to
process the inux of data produced.
The fact that it is a "regulation" instead of a "directive" means
it is directly applicable to all EU member states without a need
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for national implementing legislation, which will unify the rules
through EU instead of merely harmonising them.
Basic principles of the data protection remain with the GDPR
the same as before. It requires data controllers and processors to
process personal data fairly, lawfully and transparently, to take
all reasonable steps to ensure that personal data are accurate and
secure. It also forbids them from using the data for dierent pur-
poses, than for which it was collected, from storing data that are
not needed to achieve its processing purposes and from storing the
data longer than necessary in relation to the processing purposes.
Main changes that the GDPR introduces are following: First, it
extends the jurisdiction of EU data protection law, as it applies to
all entities processing the personal data of data subjects residing in
the Union, regardless of the entities location. Second, it increases
applicable sanctions, as organisations in breach of the GDPR can
be ned up to 4% of annual global turnover or 20 million EUR
(whichever is greater). Third, it introduces new rights of the data
subject and related obligations for data controllers and processors.
Controllers will be obliged to notify the data subject of any
data breach which is likely to "result in a risk for the rights and
freedoms of individuals", to provide upon request from the data
subject information about extent and purposes of processing of
their data and dump of their personal data being processed, to
delete upon request the personal data if it is no longer relevant to
original purposes for processing, or if the data subject withdrawn
the consent for processing.
The GDPR has also placed great emphasis on the accountability
principle for data controllers and processors to demonstrate data
compliance. They are newly required to maintain certain documen-
tation, conduct impact assessment reports for riskier processing
and employ data protection practices by default.
4.3 Personal data and it’s use
The GDPR in its Art. 4 para. 1 denes the personal data very broadly
as "any information about identied or identiable person". This
person is in the data protection terminology related to as the "data
subject". The same article of the GDPR also states that by identi-
able person is meant "a person, who may be directly or indirectly
identied" and follows with demonstrative list of elements that may
lead to identication including ID number, location data, online
identier or personal specics.
For the purposes of alert sharing platforms is most relevant de-
nition of online identier. This term is further explained in recital
30 of the regulation, which states that "natural persons may be
associated with online identiers provided by their devices, appli-
cations, tools and protocols, such as Internet protocol addresses,
cookie identiers or other identiers such as radio frequency iden-
tication tags. This may leave traces which, in particular when
combined with unique identiers and other information received
by the servers, may be used to create proles of the natural per-
sons and identify them." This concept in combination with relevant
CJEU case-law, which applies rather extensive approach to the in-
terpretation of the concept of personal data, leads to a situation
where almost any data that is shared between peers of alert sharing
platforms, could be personal data.
As we mentioned above in Section 3.2, any data that can peers
get from the data trac in their systems may be shared. Such
data may contain not only identiers like IP addresses, domain
names, URLs, or email addresses, but also pieces of transferred
content. Even considering the fact, that in some cases such data
may not be sucient to identify specic natural person and that
individual peers will most likely share only limited amount of data
to protect their users and themselves, we have to assume that this
data, especially when combined, can directly or indirectly identify
the data subject.
This approach is supported not only by Article 29 working party
of data protection authorities of EU countries, which states in its
opinion that "the controller that processes IP addresses anticipates
that the "means likely reasonably to be used" to identify the persons
will be available, e. g., through the courts appealed to (otherwise
the collection of the information makes no sense), and therefore the
information should be considered as personal data" [1], and also
by CJEU case-law. In Scarlet case (No. C-70-10), the CJEU stated
that "[IP] addresses are protected personal data because they allow
users to be precisely identied" [4]. In Breyer case (no. c-582/14) the
CJEU concluded that "dynamic IP address [...] constitutes personal
data [...], in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal
means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional
data which the internet service provider has about that person" [5],
while by legal means might according to Sokol et. al. be for example
just a possibility to hand the data over to the police which has then
access to data retention data [17].
So it is safe to say that at least some of the data shared using alert
sharing platforms should be considered personal data. At the same
time, we have to take into account that we are not able to separate
such personal data from other shared data, because it is technically
impossible. Which is why all of the shared data should be treated as
personal data, because, as Article 29 working party puts it, "unless
the provider is in a position to distinguish with absolute certainty
that the data correspond to users that cannot be identied, it will
have to treat all IP information as personal data, to be on the safe
side" [1].
Now we know that we are dealing with personal data, but when
and for what purposes can we use it? We mentioned purpose limita-
tion above in the Section 4.2, this principle requires data controllers
to collect personal data for specied, explicit and legitimate pur-
poses. Such data may then be processed only in order to achieve
declared purpose and if it is to be processed in a manner that is in-
compatible with this purpose, the data controller has to nd another
legal ground or cease the data processing.
The GDPR provides six legal grounds for personal data process-
ing: consent of the data subject, performance of contract with data
subject, legal obligation of the controller, protection of vital inter-
ests of the data subject, public interest and legitimate interest of
the controller or third party. It would be practically impossible to
get valid consent from every data subject, whose personal data are
shared via alert sharing platforms, because in most cases the data
controller is not in direct contact with the data subject. In specic
cases may be the personal data shared using these platforms in
compliance with legal obligation of the controller. For instance,
according to so-called NIS directive (No. (EU) 2016/1148) requires
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operators of essential services and digital services providers to no-
tify competent authorities of any signicant security incident, if
they would do so using sharing platform, it would be legitimate
and legal. However, in most cases are the alert sharing platforms
operated by private entities and individual peers are not required
by law to provide any data.
So we are down to the last two legal grounds - protection of vital
interest of the data subject and legitimate interest of the controller
or third party. Even though sharing of alert data aims to protect not
only the sharing organisations, but also the security and privacy
of users, we cannot assume that sharing of specic data is always
done in order to protect its data subject. For instance if the data
subject is attacker trying to hack into the computer system – here
we are protecting users, but not the data subject.
4.4 Legitimate interest and proportionality test
The last legal ground is most tting, but at the same time most
complicated to use. According to the GDPR the processing of per-
sonal data is lawful if "processing is necessary for the purposes
of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third
party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require
protection of personal data" [3].
The GDPR provide for "legitimate interest" as a legal ground
for processing personal data. Some cyber security professionals
understood it so that their activities are always covered and they can
freely use almost any personal data for security purposes without
consent from data subjects. Even some EU member states saw it
only as one of six options, and one which is no more or no less
important than the other options, and which may apply in a large
number and large variety of situations, provided the necessary
conditions are met. This is however not always the case, because
this legal ground should only be used sparingly to ll in gaps for
rare and unforeseen situation as ’a last resort’ - or as a last chance
if no other grounds may apply. The Article 29 Working Party has
already made it clear that merely having a legitimate interest by
itself is not enough to entitle controller to use personal data. The
objective of the "legitimate interest" provision is to provide them
with "necessary exibility for data controllers for situations where
there is no undue impact on data subjects". The Article 29 Working
Party also cautioned that this legal ground is not to be used "on the
basis that it is less constraining than the other grounds" [1].
In comparison with the Data protection directive, the GDPR
adds a requirement, that the ’legitimate interest’ of the controller
or third party can not justify use of personal data if their "interest
is overridden by interest or fundamental rights of the data subject".
Which means that a controller that plans to process personal data
must balance its legitimate interest against the rights of the data
subject, but also "the data subject’s interests, irrespective of whether
these interests are legitimate or not. Any controller that hopes to
use legitimate interest also bears the onus for demonstrating that
its interest is favored in such a balancing test" [2]. The Article
29 Working Party cautions that the balancing test should also be
suciently documented in such a way that data subjects, data
authorities, and the courts can examine.
In this balancing test, the controller that share large amount of
data should, among other, consider, that if this data is combined with
data shared by other peers then using big data analysis techniques
might lead to unexpected results, which may be highly intrusive to
the individual privacy.
Another factor in the balancing test is mentioned in Recital 47 of
the GDPR: ". . . taking into consideration the reasonable expectation
of data subjects based on their relationship to the controller". A con-
troller involved in sharing of incident data must ask the following
question: Is it reasonable to assume that a regular person who uses
my infrastructure expects that their behaviour is being tracked and
measured, consolidated across devices, and that the results of these
operations are being traded between dierent organisations that
he or she has never heard of, and retained for further trading and
consolidation over considerable periods of time? [2]
Let’s be more specic. If we want to justify processing and shar-
ing of personal data in alert sharing platforms by "legitimate inter-
est" of peers, we need to take following steps:
(1) determine, if this interest is legitimate one,
(2) determine whether the processing is necessary to achieve
the interested pursued,
(3) establish a provisional balance by assessing whether the
data controller’s interest is overridden by the fundamental
rights or interests of the data subjects,
(4) establish a nal balance by taking into account additional
safeguards,
(5) demonstrate compliance and ensure transparency.
In both the opinion of the Article 29 working party and the GDPR
it is mentioned that cyber security is one of the elds, in which it
is likely that the personal data will be processed due to legitimate
interest of the controller. Recital 49 of the GDPR specically states
that "the processing of personal data to the extent strictly neces-
sary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and
information security, [...] constitutes a legitimate interest of the
data controller concerned" [3]. So it is probably safe to say that so
called CIA triad2 of data and information systems is a legitimate
interest within the meaning of the GPDR.
Next we need to establish, that the sharing of incident data is
necessary for the purpose of ensuring cyber security, and that
there are no equally eective and less invasive methods available to
achieve such legitimate interest. While it is dicult to measure the
eect of sharing on security, most cyber security professionals and
academics agree, that the sharing is the only eective method of
protection against specic types of incidents [11, 23]. Irreplaceable
role of sharing in cyber security is accepted also in EU legislation,
the NIS directive states in recital 35 that "[providers] should be
encouraged to pursue their own informal cooperation mechanisms
to ensure the security of network and information systems. To en-
courage eectively the sharing of information and of best practice,
it is essential to ensure that operators of essential services and
digital service providers who participate in such exchanges are not
disadvantaged as a result of their cooperation."
Establishment of provisional balance between controller’s legiti-
mate interest and rights and interests of data subject is a complex
assessment, which should be conducted on case by case basis rather
2Condentiality, integrity, availability.
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than in an abstract manner. We can however derive specic criteria
which should be taken into account. First we need to point out, that
sharing of alert data benets not only the peers that use sharing
platforms, it also increases security of users of aected systems,
some of which are at the same time data subjects, and wider com-
munity. Next we need to take into consideration the amount of data
being shared. In some cases, some of the data are shared "just in
case it is needed" and at the same time have very little inuence
on security. Another thing is that every controller should analyse
severity of the incidents they are likely to prevent or mitigate and
how widely those benets can be shared with other peers. On the
other side of the balancing test, where we deal with possible impact
of sharing the data on data subject, we need to distinguish between
dierent categories of data. Sharing of tools or information on ma-
licious software will likely contain no or very little personal data.
In the case of IoCs only very little data is being shared and even
though it contains identiers, it would be rather complicated for
other peers to connect them to specic data subject. In these cases
is the risk of processing for most data subjects very low. Far higher
risk pose sharing of reports of security incidents and raw data,
processing of which especially in combination with data shared by
other peers may inuence not only interest, but in some cases even
fundamental rights of data subjects. So in some cases the controller
should in the next step implement further measures in order to
ensure higher protection of such data.
If after establishing a provisional balance the answer is not clear
cut, one can go on to consider how introducing additional safe-
guards could prevent undue impact on the data subjects in order to
help tip the balance in favour of the controller. These safeguards
are discussed in following Section 5.
Last step is to demonstrate compliance and ensure transparency.
Every controller should create proper documentation of the balance
test and of any additional safeguards implemented. It is also a good
idea to openly provide information about specics of the processing
not only to Data protection authorities but also to data subjects.
4.5 Other issues to consider
Another specic of the sharing platforms is the fact that some of
the entities involved in its operation may have dierent position.
For instance one entity might act as operator of the platform, while
others are just nodes who share or receive shared data. This is from
the legal point of view somewhat important, because there may
be dierent obligations for each kind of entity. Especially for the
operator of the platform, if the shared data are collected and further
analysed, in operator’s database. Due to discrepancies between
operation of dierent platforms, it is necessary to always deal with
legal position of each involved entity and legal basis for their mutual
cooperation. In above mentioned situation for instance, the operator
may be both in position of controller as well as processor of the
personal data being shared.
Second issue is analysis of the data. In some sharing platforms
the data is collected in one information system which conducts
their analysis, and than distributes results of such analysis to nodes.
Such analysis may in some cases fall within the following denition
of proling in the GDPR: "proling means any form of automated
processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data
to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in
particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural per-
son’s [...] reliability, [or] behaviour" [3]. If the system is for example
creating reputation database of IP addresses based on collected
data and IP’s with bad reputation are then automatically blocked
by nodes, it may cause violation of right of data subjects dened
in Art. 22 of the GDPR. It states that "the data subject shall have
the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including proling, which produces legal or similarly
signicant eects him or her" unless the decision is necessary for
contract with the subject, authorised by public authority or based
on subject’s explicit consent.
Last issue we would like to stress is sharing of the data with
nodes from outside the EU. Transfer of personal data outside the EU
is in the GDPR forbidden unless adequate level of data protection
is provided3. Transfers may be made only where the Commission
has decided that a third country, a territory or one or more specic
sectors in the third country, or an international organisation ensures
an adequate level of protection, or if appropriate safeguards are in
place. These safeguards may be provided for by:
• a legally binding agreement between public authorities or
bodies;
• binding corporate rules (agreements governing transfers
made between organisations within in a corporate group);
• standard data protection clauses in the form of template
transfer clauses adopted by the Commission;
• standard data protection clauses in the form of template
transfer clauses adopted by a supervisory authority and
approved by the Commission;
• compliance with an approved code of conduct approved
by a supervisory authority;
• certication under an approved certication mechanism
as provided for in the GDPR;
• contractual clauses agreed authorised by the competent
supervisory authority; or
• provisions inserted in to administrative arrangements be-
tween public authorities or bodies authorised by the com-
petent supervisory authority4.
So unless the territory in which the ’third-country node’ resides
is considered safe by the Commission or at least one of listed safe-
guards is in place, the sharing platform must be able to ensure
complete anonymisation of data shared with this node or cease the
sharing completely.
5 HOW TO MAKE THE SHARING LEGAL
In this section we discuss specic measures that controllers can
and should implement in order to ensure compliance with EU data
protection law and to prevent undue impact of sharing the data on
the rights and interests of the data subject.
5.1 Privacy by design and default
One of the principles on which is based protection of personal data
in the GDPR is protection by design and default. This principle is
3See Chapter V. of the GDPR
4See for instance online: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-reform/
overview-of-the-gdpr/transfer-of-data/
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captured in the Art. 25 of the GDPR which states, that "the con-
troller shall [...] implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to imple-
ment data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an
eective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the
processing" and that "the controller shall implement appropriate
technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default,
only personal data which are necessary for each specic purpose
of the processing are processed" [3].
The law does not provide any complete list of possible security
measures, however GDPR specically mentions some useful tools
and refers to current state of the art. We also need to consider
the fact that it is not necessary and in some cases even possible
to always use all the tools. When determining which measures to
implement, we have to take into account the state of the art, the
cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes
of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity
for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing.
In following subsections we propose basic technical, organisa-
tional and legal measures that can be used to ensure compliance
with the GDPR. It is however not complete list, because rst, there
is too many possible tools, second, some platform require special
attention and use of specic measures, and third, the state of the
art is constantly changing and new tools may become available.
5.2 Technical measures
Technical measures of data protection in security alert sharing
platforms can be divided in two main groups, security of storage
and security of data transfer.
From the perspective of data storage security, there are only
minor dierences from storing any other personal information. The
additional issue is the distribution of the data that can be spread
across the sharing platform, especially in peer-to-peer platforms.
Thus, all the nodes that store the data should be secured appro-
priately. However, it is often more reasonable to discard the data
immediately after they are used due to their large volumes.
The problem of data distribution is closely tied to the second
perspective of securing the alert sharing platform, the security
of the data transfer. Securing the network connections via cryp-
tographic means is nowadays a standard even in common net-
work trac. Proper authentication and authorization, using cryp-
tographic means, is also needed to assure the legitimacy of peers,
while increasing the overall trust in the sharing platform [20].
If a more detailed control over the distribution of the data is
required, e. g., in a situation, where the piece of information can be
shared with only a limited number of peers, additional features of
the sharing platform should be implemented. Eorts were made
to adapt well-known Trac Light Protocol5 (TLP) for the needs of
automated information exchange. An example of such eort is the
Information Exchange Policy (EIP)6.
5.3 Organisational measures
Organisational measures can be divided into three main groups
âĂŞ measures that relate to data, measures that relate to access to
5https://www.rst.org/tlp
6https://www.rst.org/iep/FIRST_IEP_framework_1_0.pdf
the data and measures related to organisation. First group include
measures like data minimisation, limitation of storage period, sec-
ond deals with access control and categorization of the data and
the last periodical risk analysis and impact assessments.
Data minimisation is connected to the purpose limitation of
processing of personal data mentioned above in the Section3.2. Ac-
cording to this principle, in the collection stage and in the following
processing stage, personal data has to be fully avoided or minimised
as much as possible. Consequently, personal data must be erased or
eectively anonymised as soon as it is not anymore needed for the
given purpose. This requirement applies in case of those who share
data in the sharing platforms, as well as to its operator. Ability of
the operator to control may be however relatively limited, due to
the amount of shared data or technical specics of the platform.
One way how to deal with this issue is to require nodes to share
data in structured form or in pre-dened categories, which would
make the cleanup of the data easier.
The limitation of storage period is very similar. For example,
some data about security incident may be relevant during ongoing
attack or response (for example raw data for forensic analysis).
This data however has often no further use for future analysis and
therefore should be automatically deleted. In some cases would be
also useful to implement regular cleanup procedure, which would
analyse stored data delete those that are of no further use.
Another measure proposed directly in the GDPR is so-called
Data protection impact assessment. If processing operations are
likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural
persons, the controller should carry-out a data protection impact as-
sessment to evaluate, in particular, the origin, nature, particularity
and severity of that risk. In some cases (systematic and extensive
evaluation of personal aspects, processing of large scale data, sys-
tematic monitoring of publicly accessible area) it is even required
prior to processing. Even though in our opinion the mere sharing
of cyber security data itself does not lead to this obligation, in some
cases7 we would recommend to conduct at least simplied but docu-
mented assessment or risk analysis. The reason is that the outcome
of the assessment might be extremely helpful when determining
the appropriate measures to be taken in order to demonstrate that
the processing of personal data complies with the GDPR.
Finally, last organisational measure that could be recommended
is to regularly check if implemented safequards are sucient and
eective. The reason is that the quality, quantity or nature of col-
lected or shared data might change, and that there could be new
ways how to ensure compliance. Documented regular checks could
also be used as a proof of compliance.
5.4 Legal measures
There are two main levels on which we can apply legal measures to
ensure proper protection of personal data - the level of the platform
and the level of individual nodes.
At the level of platform is most important to ensure that sucient
level of protection is ensured by each node. For this purpose, any
operator of the platform should require each node to implement
minimal security requirements which would dene, what kind of
data can be shared, how should be protected received data, and
7For instance if the data controller is unsure which additional safeguards to implement.
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what additional safeguards is each node required to implement.
This can be done in the form of common rules for usage of the
platform, or in the form of service-level agreement between the
operator and each node.
At the level of individual nodes should be ensured protection
of the data against unauthorised use. This could be done by imple-
menting internal directives, which would dene who can determine
the methods and scope of data processing, who can access which
data, how to handle them, and specify the responsibilities of in-
dividual employees. Another legal tool which should be always
implemented are non disclosure agreements with every employee
with access to the personal data.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Legal issues related to cyber security data sharing are extremely
interesting and important research topic. This paper focuses particu-
larly on personal data protection in security alert sharing platforms.
Recent changes in the EU data protection law have prompted an
intensive discussion about the extent to which personal data protec-
tion aects the use of these tools. This paper therefore summarizes
main legal issues that should be considered when ensuring the com-
pliance with the General data protection regulation and proposes
tools and measures that can be used to deal with these issues.
First, we investigated what data are being shared using security
alerts sharing platforms and for what purpose. Then we explained
current development in data protection law in the EU and intro-
duced its basic principles.
Second, based on these ndings we analysed conditions for col-
lection and sharing of personal data in these platforms, legal basis
for their operation and identied main legal issues that need to be
considered when ensuring compliance. Then we proposed legal,
organisational and technical measures that can be implemented to
ensure lawful operation of platforms and high level of protection
of personal data.
The conclusions of this paper open issues that need to be ad-
dressed in the context of future research. In connection with the
legitimate interest of the controller, it would be useful to conduct
detailed analysis of how the balancing test should be conducted and
which criterions should be taken into account. Other newly opened
research question is what is the best legal solution that would allow
non-EU organisations to participate in these sharing platforms.
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